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The death of inflation
通货膨胀的终结

Central banks in the rich world may have been too successful in subduing price pressures
发达国家的中央银行抑制价格举动或许用力过猛。

IT TOOK an iron will (and a handbag) to beat the inflation of the 1970s. Under Margaret Thatcher the British government squeezed the economy with high interest rates until the beast submitted. The Federal Reserve, then led by Paul Volcker, followed suit. Such displays of fortitude convinced markets that governments were serious about keeping inflation low. Expectations of future price increases converged around central-bank targets, touching off an era of long expansions and mild recessions. Yet relative price stability may now be adding to the rich world’s economic woes.
钢铁般的意志(以及一只手提袋)成功抑制了上世纪70年代的通货膨胀。玛格丽特•撒切尔治下的英国政府采用高利率的经济政策压低经济增长率，直至通胀巨兽束手就擒。其时由保罗•沃克尔主导的美国联邦储蓄银行在抑制通胀方面的政策紧随其后。政府在此期间所展现的勇气和决断使市场确信政府会豪不手软地压低通货膨胀率。未来价格增幅预期唯央行通胀目标是瞻，由此触发了一个经济长期扩张但偶有温和衰退的时代。但是，相对的价格稳定性目前对于发达国家的经济状况来说不啻于一个困境。

Deep recessions like the recent global contraction would normally be expected to send inflation tumbling. Workless labourers ought to reduce wage demands to find employment; firms with unsold goods should slash prices to clear inventories. There was every reason to expect that inflation would go to zero or even enter negative territory in recent years. In April 2009 the International Monetary Fund forecast that inflation in that year would be -0.2% for advanced economies. Instead it has barely budged across the latest business cycle (see left-hand chart).
人们通常认为像最近全球经济收缩此类的严重衰退会压低通货膨胀率。失业的劳动者为了寻求就业机会理应会降低薪资要求；有滞销产品的企业应该降低商品价格清理库存。近些年来，人们有充分的理由来预计通货膨胀率会降至零或者负值以下。2009年4月，国际货币基金组织预先通报了发达经济体当年通货膨胀率将会是-0.2%。相反，当年的通货膨胀率几乎毫不为最近的商业周期所动(见右表)。

Deflation has been the “dog that didn’t bark”, notes the IMF in its new “World Economic Outlook”. When America’s unemployment rate jumped between 1980 and 1982, by 4.5 percentage points to 10.8%, core inflation plummeted from 12.0% to 4.5%. The jobless rate in America rose even more steeply between 2007 and 2009 but inflation dropped by less than one percentage point, from about 2.4% to 1.7%. Where inflation rates rose above central bankers’ targets, as in Britain, or below them, as in Japan, expectations of future rates still stayed close to the targets.
国际货币基金组织在其最新发布的《世界经济展望》中强调，通货紧缩一直以来都是“一只不叫的狗”。1980年至1982年间，美国失业率跃升了4.5的百分点高达10.8%，而核心通货膨胀率从12.0%降至4.5%。2007至2009年间，美国失业率升幅更加剧烈，可是通货膨胀率却下降了不到1个百分点，从2.4%降至1.7%。有些国家通货膨胀率高于（以英国为例）或低于（以日本为例）央行目标通胀值，可通货膨胀率预期却始终接近于央行的目标值。

Some economists argue that stable inflation is a result of some big changes in the labour market. Wages and prices did not fall by much in recent years because jobless workers exited the labour force for good—a result of over-generous welfare benefits and obsolete skills. Such people do not compete with others for jobs and therefore cannot drag down inflation.
一些经济学家认为稳定的通货膨胀率是劳动力市场发生的巨变所致。近些年来，在过度慷慨的社会福利和劳动技能过时的情况下，失业劳动力永久退出劳动力市场，因此薪资水平和商品价格下降幅度不大。退出劳动力市场的工人不再与其他人竞争工作机会，因此他们不可能对降低通货膨胀率产生任何影响。

Another view is that stability reflects central banks’ credibility. When central banks whipped inflation in the early 1980s and adopted low targets for it, they firmly anchored beliefs about future growth in prices and wages. This credibility is self-reinforcing. Workers who expect prices to rise only slowly tend not to push as hard for higher wages. That helps firms to keep costs and prices down. When the crisis struck, this process also helped avert deflation. If prices are not expected to drop, workers are less likely to accept wage cuts. Anticipating stable wage demands, employers are more reluctant to cut prices.
另一个观点是通货膨胀率所展现出的稳定性反映了各国央行的可信度。上世纪80年代后期，各国央行大力遏制通货膨胀并为其设定了较低的目标值，他们对未来商品价格和薪资水平可能会出现的增幅深信不疑。而这种可信度不断在自我强化。期望商品价格缓慢上升的劳动者往往不会强烈要求提高薪资。这有助于企业保持低水平的成本和价格。当经济危机来袭时，这一机制同样也有助于抑制通货紧缩。如果商品的价格预期不会降低，那么劳动者就不太可能会接受薪资的削减。稳定的薪资要求在雇主的预期之内，那么他们就更不会愿意降低商品的价格。

This second story seems a better fit for the data, argues the IMF. Since 1990 expected rates of inflation have inched ever closer to central-bank targets. And over the same period short-term gaps between actual inflation and the official target had ever weaker effects on people’s expectations. Markets seem to trust central banks to return inflation to target, and that trust itself helps keep it in line (though the dispersion in expected inflation rates seems to have widened lately).
国际货币基金组织认为，第二个理由似乎更能与数据相契合。自1990年以来,通货膨胀率预期一直逐步向央行所设定的目标值靠拢。而同期实际通货膨胀率和官方目标之间的短期差距对人们预期的影响越来越微弱。市场似乎相信央行能够将通货膨胀率控制在目标值内，而且信任本身有助于通货膨率不越雷池一步（虽然预期通货膨胀率离散值似乎近来在扩大。）

As inflation has become more anchored, its links with other economic indicators have weakened. In a study of 21 rich countries since the 1960s, the IMF shows that changes in unemployment now influence inflation much less than in the past (see right-hand chart). Without the breakdown in this relationship, America’s economy would have faced deflation rates approaching 3% in the wake of the recent recession, the IMF notes.
随着通货膨胀率变得愈来愈稳固，这一指标与其它经济指标之间的联系也愈来愈弱。国际货币基金组织研究了自上世纪60年代以来21个发达国家的经济状况，该研究表明：就目前而言，失业率的变动对通货膨胀率的影响远不如从前（见右表）。国际货币基金组织强调若是其间的关联性保持不变，那么美国经济在最近一次经济衰退之初的通货紧缩率将会接近3%的水平。

That is small comfort to inflation hawks, who fear that expectations may well prove less anchored during the next boom. After all, firms could easily be more enthusiastic about raising prices than cutting them. Yet experience before the financial crisis suggests that boom times may not be so different. In the decade before the crisis unemployment in Britain, Ireland and Spain dipped below its estimated “natural rate” (the lowest sustainable rate) for years at a time. Actual inflation and expectations of it hardly budged.
对于担忧通货膨胀率预期值在下次经济繁荣时期无法表现出强劲稳定性的通胀鹰派来说，这足以让他们稍感宽慰。毕竟，企业更热衷于提高而不是降低商品价格。但是金融危机前的经验表明经济繁荣时期的情况或许没有太大的差别。金融危机前的10年里，英国、爱尔兰和西班牙曾出现过失业率连续几年跌破其估计的“自然率”（最低可持续发展率）的情况。而实际通货膨胀率和预期值几乎毫不受此影响。

What could cause inflation expectations to break free again, as in the 1970s? Contrasting the experience of the American and German economies, the IMF reckons that central-bank independence makes all the difference. Both the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank mistakenly saw 1970s-era unemployment as mostly temporary. But the Bundesbank managed to resist its government’s calls for looser monetary policy. The Fed, under its then chairman, Arthur Burns, was more responsive to Richard Nixon’s demands. Only in the late 1970s, when public opinion no longer saw unemployment but inflation as the chief economic evil, was it politically possible to give the Fed licence to stamp out inflation.
是什么因素导致了上世纪70年代通货膨胀率预期值免受其他经济指标的影响呢？国际货币基金组织对比了美国和德国经济发展的经验，据此得出结论认为央行的独立性决定了一切。美联储和德国联邦银行均错误的认为70年代出现的失业不过是昙花一现。但是德国联邦银行成功地顶住了政府要求他们进一步放松货币政策的压力。在当时的美联储主席阿瑟•伯恩斯（Arthur Burns）的领导下，美联储积极地响应了时任美国总统理查德•尼克松（Richard Nixon）的要求。仅仅在70年代后期，当舆论认为经济的罪魁祸首主要是通货膨胀而不是失业之后，美联储才能政治层面获得抑制通货膨胀率的许可。

Missing the target
渐渐迷失目标

Low inflation may be central bankers’ proudest achievement but it comes with its own set of economic risks, argues the IMF. The economic stability of the pre-crisis era may have fuelled the excess borrowing that led to the financial crisis. And a 2012 IMF working paper suggests that reining in inflation can increase income inequality by compressing wages while allowing asset prices to soar.
国际货币基金组织认为低通货膨胀率或许是央行高管最引以为傲的成就，但低通胀率本身却存在诸多经济风险。前金融危机时代经济情况所表现出来的稳定性或许给信贷泛滥起到了火上浇油的效果，而过渡举债正是金融危机的导火索。国际货币基金组织在2012年发布的一份工作报告中指出，压低薪资水平的同时却允许资产价格飙升，通过这种手段来抑制通货膨胀会扩大收入不公的差距。

More worryingly, the weakening link between inflation and unemployment could breed complacency about rising joblessness. Central bankers weaned on tales from the 1930s and 1980s, when soaring unemployment produced tumbling inflation, may have underestimated recent economic troubles because of stable inflation. An outbreak of deflation might have prompted them to act sooner and even more resolutely to battle the recession. Central banks are victims of their own success. With inflation no longer a reliable indicator of demand, they must look elsewhere to keep economies from running hot or cold.
更令人担忧的是，通货膨胀率和失业率之间日益脆弱的关联性可能会令人对不断上升的失业率毫无警觉，进而无动于衷。当不断上升的失业率导致通货膨胀率不断波动的时候，对上世纪30年和80年发生的一切熟稔于胸各国央行高管们或许因为稳定的通货膨胀率而低估了近来出现的经济问题。突然爆发的通货紧缩或许会促使他们迅速行动，甚至会迫使他们拿出最具成效的解决之法来应对经济衰退。央行为其成功所累。由于通货膨涨率不再是一个可靠的需求反映指标，各国央行必须另寻它途来防止经济运行过热或是过冷。

Sources
资料来源

“The dog that didn’t bark: Has inflation been muzzled or was it just sleeping?”, IMF World Economic Outlook

“Innocent Bystanders? Monetary Policy and Inequality in the U.S.”, Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Lorenz Kueng, and John Silvia, IMF Working Paper

Economist.com/blogs/freeexchange

From the print edition: Finance and economics